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 Abstract  
 
Episodic memory and future thinking are crucial capacities that emerge and undergo 
substantial development during the preschool years.  However, their relationship has 
rarely been examined in tandem within development.  Narratives were elicited from 3-, 4-
, and 5-year-old children (n = 36) to assess episodic memory and future thinking.  The 
richness of children’s memory and imagined future episodes was measured by the 
number of episodic details in their narratives.  Non-narrative measures of episodic 
memory and future thinking were also administered.  As hypothesized, children’s ability 
to recall personal events and generate possible future events underwent substantial 
development during the preschool years on three of the four memory and future thinking 
tasks, with the exception of narrative future thinking.  Nevertheless, narrative memory 
and narrative future thinking remained correlated even after controlling for working 
memory, inhibition, verbal ability and narrative fluency.  These results suggest the 
possibility of a common neurocognitive basis underlying narrative memory and narrative 
future thinking in preschool development.  Mental time travel and scene construction are 
identified as possible common mechanisms underlying this relationship.    
 Keywords: episodic memory, future thinking, preschoolers, development, 
executive function, narrative, scene construction, mental time travel 
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Emergence of Human Episodic Memory and Future Thinking 
          Episodic memory is inherently reconstructive.  As no brain region stores memories 
in their entirety, details of personal episodes such as a past birthday—the candles on the 
tiramisu cake, the weather in the backyard, the faces of family members present—are 
stored in widely distributed brain areas and are recombined at each recall to create a 
relatively coherent scene (Hassabis, Kumaran, Vann, & Maguire, 2007; Schacter & 
Addis, 2007).  Consisting of rich spatiotemporal detail, these episodic or autobiographical 
memories are not veridical copies of an original experience but rather imperfect 
regenerations, pieced together from subsets of the scene’s perceived and interpreted 
features.  Although the exact process by which elements are recalled and indexed 
together is not well understood, perceptual details are often stored near their site of 
processing (e.g., visual cortex, auditory cortex) while more complex details and 
inferences may traverse higher order regions (e.g., association cortices).  Episodic 
remembering thus recruits multiple brain areas, often the prefrontal cortex, medial 
temporal structures (e.g., hippocampus, parahippocampal gyrus), and certain posterior 
brain regions (e.g., retrosplenial cortex) (Buckner & Carroll, 2007).  
          The reconstructive nature of episodic memory is now considered an essential 
feature of a system adapted for prediction, recombination, and generation of novel 
possibilities, contributing to a larger reconceptualization of the brain as potentially 
adapted for “prospective” thinking (Schacter, Addis, & Buckner, 2007).  Episodic future 
thinking—the ability to project oneself to the future to pre-experience an event—heavily 
engages spatiotemporal context and visual imagery, though not as extensively as memory 
recall for concrete events (Viard et al., 2011).  Strikingly, much of the neural network 
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supporting episodic memory (e.g., prefrontal cortex, hippocampus, parahippocampus 
gyrus, posterior regions) is also engaged during future thinking (Hassabis et al., 2007; 
Schacter & Addis, 2007).  Functional neuroimaging reveals considerable overlap of 
activated regions when adults separately imagine a plausible future event and elaborate 
on a past autobiographical event (Addis, Wong, & Schacter, 2007).  By representing 
events across common activation patterns in the brain, memory traces support prospective 
thinking by providing the raw materials from one’s reservoir of personal experiences to 
be recombined into new simulations of the future (Addis et al., 2007; Suddendorf, 
2010a). 
          The medial temporal lobe (MTL) appears to be a major brain region involved in 
reconstruction during episodic memory and future thinking.  The hippocampus, a core 
MTL structure long established to be integral to episodic memory, has been proposed to 
be a key region involved in binding disparate elements together during mental 
construction of past and future scenarios (Hassabis & Maguire, 2007).  In a 
demonstrative study, amnesic adults with severe bilateral hippocampal damage and 
deficient episodic memory were also significantly impaired at imagining new experiences 
(e.g., “a day at the beach”), despite spared general world knowledge (Hassabis et al., 
2007).  Amnesic individuals reported imagined scenarios that were fragmented and 
markedly impoverished in spatial coherence.  These individuals not only lose access to 
certain life experiences in their past, but also have marked difficulty at projecting 
themselves in future time-space.   
          In the strongest evidence yet of the MTL’s role in episodic memory and future 
thinking, the extent of episodic memory and future thinking impairment in adult 
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individuals has been shown to be highly and positively correlated (Race, Keane & 
Verfaellie, 2011).  In Race et al. (2011), eight amnesic adults with MTL damage were 
asked to provide narratives about several specific possible future events and personal past 
events (e.g., graduation ceremony, winning the lottery).  The richness of their episodic 
memory and future narratives, as measured by the total number of episodic details (i.e., 
specific details of events, places, times, perceptions, and thoughts/emotions), was 
significantly impoverished compared to that of healthy controls.  These deficits in 
memory and future thinking were not explained by working memory and narrative 
construction demands of the tasks as amnesic individuals demonstrated normal 
performance when asked to tell stories about random detailed pictures.  Furthermore, 
memory and future thinking impairments were highly correlated (r = 0.75).  Additionally, 
one patient with purely hippocampal lesions demonstrated memory and future thinking 
deficits that resembled those with more extensive MTL damage, suggesting that 
hippocampal damage alone may be enough to impair both abilities.  The claim that 
memory for the past may contribute to imagination for the future has also been supported 
by demonstrations of parallel and potentially correlated deficits in episodic remembering 
and future thinking in older adults, in schizophrenic individuals, and in clinically 
depressed adults (Addis, Wong & Schacter, 2008; Buckner, 2010; Sumner, Griffith, & 
Mineka, 2011).   
Typical Development of Episodic Memory and Future Thinking  
          Another approach to examining whether episodic memory and future thinking 
share some fundamental underpinnings is to study these abilities in development.  The 
possible relationship between memory and future thinking has been a source of explosive 
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interest in the cognitive psychology and neuroscience field in recent years.  However, 
few studies have examined memory and future thinking in tandem in children.  Children 
represent a population in which episodic memory and future thinking naturally vary and 
improve, particularly between the ages of three and five.  Episodic memory and future 
thinking may develop similarly if they also rely on the same neurocognitive resources.  
An attempt to test this claim requires further examination of both capacities in typically 
developing children.  Developmental research can offer crucial and influential 
contributions to the study of the future thinking and its link to memory, especially as the 
majority of studies have been mainly limited to healthy adult or clinical populations.   
          As mentioned previously, episodic memory appears to emerge and undergo 
substantial development between the ages of three and five.  By their first birthday, 
children are able to retain nonverbal memory of novel props they engaged with in 
conjunction with an experimenter in a past episode (Bauer, Hertsgaard, & Dow, 1994; 
McDonough & Mandler, 1994).  Despite the demonstration of early nonverbal memory, 
mature episodic memory is not considered to emerge until at least three years of age.  
Mature episodic memory involves “re-living” a previous experience and is typically 
accompanied by autonoetic awareness (Wheeler, Stuss, & Tulving, 1997), which refers to 
a subjective sense of familiarity that one has experienced this event before (Buckner & 
Carroll, 2007).   
          Studies of amnesic individuals with severely impaired autonoetic awareness have 
suggested that the medial temporal lobe and the frontal lobe, particularly the prefrontal 
cortex, contribute to awareness of self in time (Wheeler et al., 1997).  Very young 
children with naturally premature frontal lobes also lack this continuous causal 
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understanding of events and themselves in time (Naito & Suzuki, 2011).  In the early 
preschool years, young children’s episodic memories are fragile, as reflected by frequent 
source errors, or memory errors regarding how one first acquired knowledge of a fact.  
With age, children become less susceptible to these source errors, possibly as they 
become more aware of themselves and are better able to discriminate among different 
time periods (Friedman, 1992).   
          Autonoetic awareness also accompanies future episodic thinking when one 
mentally places oneself in the future and more generally engages “mental time travel” 
beyond the immediate present (Buckner & Carroll, 2007).  Argued to be uniquely human, 
the cognitive faculty to project oneself in either temporal direction allows us to mentally 
re-live past experiences and pre-live future ones.  While remembering certain routinized 
or scripted information does not require mental time travel, re-experiencing the past and 
pre-experiencing the future are uniquely self-referential, often involving a visuospatial 
component (Hassabis & Maguire, 2007).  Episodic thinking also requires an 
understanding that one’s personal past differs from and can contribute to the present, and 
that the future can be different from and affected by one’s current states.   
          Like episodic memory, the ability to consider one’s personal future emerges during 
the preschool years (Atance & O’Neill, 2005).  Atance and Meltzoff (2005) define 
mature episodic future thinking as the ability to imagine a future state even when the state 
conflicts with the current self.  Atance and Meltzoff (2005) tested this capability by 
presenting preschoolers with a picture book trip-planning task.  The task involved color 
photographs of scenes unlikely to have been encountered yet by preschoolers (e.g., sunny 
desert, rocky river, long dirt road, snowy forest).  The experimenter asked children to 
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describe the picture, pretend that they will walk across the scene, and choose the correct 
item out of three choices that they would need to bring with them (e.g., sunglasses, band-
aids, water, winter coat).  Only one of the three choices reflected a future physiological 
need (e.g., sunglasses for the sunny desert condition).   
          Atance and Meltzoff (2005) found that 3-, 4-, and 5-year-olds chose the correct 
item above chance.  Differences between 5-year-olds and 3-year-olds were significant 
(92% vs. 61%), but not between 5-year-olds and 4-year-olds (92% vs. 75%).  
Furthermore, performance of three- and 4-year-olds, but not 5-year-olds, was negatively 
affected when one of the two distracters included an item that was semantically 
associated to the scene but irrelevant to a future need (e.g., ice cubes for the snowy forest 
condition).  Though young children of 3 and 4 years are capable of causal reasoning, they 
are less able to fully anticipate certain situations than 5-year-olds and often mistake the 
necessary object to be one with the most salient connection (i.e., semantic association) to 
the scene.  Examination of verbal explanations demonstrated that older children also 
exercised a higher proportion of future terms in their language than 3-year-olds to 
describe why they would need the item for the trip.  Children’s frequency of “future talk” 
was not related to general language ability, suggesting that the level of recognition for 
future possibilities need not rely on language maturation (Atance & O’Neill, 2005).  
Despite having the language capacity to describe actions and motivations, 3-year-old 
children do not appear to have as firmly developed a sense of a future self as their 5-year-
old counterparts.  
          Examination of children’s episodic memory and future thinking within limited 
temporal spans (e.g., yesterday, tomorrow) demonstrates improving understanding of 
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event sequence with age, which, in turn, may support more accurate mental time travel.  
Children begin to understand temporal terms such as “yesterday” and “tomorrow” by the 
third year of age, indicating that by this age, they are aware of basic temporal differences 
among the present, past and future (Atance & Jackson, 2009; Busby & Suddendorf, 2005; 
Suddendorf, 2010b).  However, the ability to generate specific answers about things that 
occurred yesterday and that could happen tomorrow, as well as the accuracy or likelihood 
of those answers as rated by parents, is not reliable at 3 years and improves in both 
temporal directions by the 5th year (Suddendorf, 2010b).  Suddendorf (2010b) found a 
significant positive association between the number of likely correct answers on 
“yesterday” and on “tomorrow” questions, suggesting that episodic memory and future 
thinking may be related.  Grant and Suddendorf (2009) administered a task that involved 
simple timelines of past and future and asked preschoolers to place pictures representing 
different events at appropriate places of 24 hours, 12 months and several years.  Five-
year-olds were better able to differentiate among temporal categories of 24 hour-, 12 
month- and several year-long intervals when compared to 3- and 4-year-olds (Grant & 
Suddendorf, 2009).  
Frontal Lobe Development and Executive Function  
          What contributes to young children’s documented improvements in memory and 
future thinking?  One possibility is that improvements in memory and in future thinking 
can result partly from natural cognitive improvements such as in executive function and 
in language (Tsujimoto, 2008).  A wide host of abilities, including improved mental time 
travel to the past and future, may progress with ongoing frontal lobe development.  In 
particular, the prefrontal cortex, which undergoes progressive age-related changes in 
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activity around 4 years of age, is known to be the seat of multiple higher general 
cognitive functions and executive function (Tsujimoto, 2008).  Executive function is a 
multi-compartmental faculty conceptualized to manage attention resources among other 
cognitive processes.  Adult executive function is widely considered to be composed of 
three separate but interrelated dimensions: working memory, inhibition of prepotent 
responses, and attention (Miyake et al., 2000).   
          Working memory (WM), often associated with the lateral prefrontal cortex, 
involves actively maintaining a temporary representation of information in immediate 
conscious and linguistic processing.  WM is crucial to carrying out most learning and 
goal-oriented tasks (Baddeley, 1992; Gathercole, 2008).  In particular, the visuospatial 
sketchpad briefly stores visual and spatial information that may be crucial in supporting 
episodic past and future thinking (Baddeley, 1992).  Visuospatial working memory can 
be measured using the standardized Corsi block tapping test (Milner, 1971), a task that 
requires the participant to tap random patterns demonstrated by the experimenter on an 
array of nine fixed blocks.  WM “span” refers to the maximum number of blocks that the 
participant is able to reproduce correctly.  WM span typically increases to an average of 
five during childhood (Issacs & Vargha-Khadem, 1989).  Young children’s limited 
visuospatial working memory may manifest itself in poor performance on memory and 
future thinking tasks that require mental construction of such visuospatial imagery.       
          Inhibition of prepotent responses, another representative prefrontal cortex function, 
is the ability to suppress irrelevant information and actions in order to complete a purpose 
(Tsujimoto, 2008).  In the Grass/Snow inhibition task, 5-year-olds inhibit certain 
prepotent responses significantly better than 3-year-olds.  In this task, children point to a 
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green color card when the experimenter says the word “snow” and to a white color card 
when the experimenter says “grass” (Sabbagh, Xu, Carlson, Moses, & Lee, 2006).  
Inhibition is perhaps most suspected to contribute to future thinking due to retraction 
from current states in order to anticipate needs of a future self (Carlson, Moses, & 
Claxton, 2004).  Better inhibition may allow older children to better mentally insert 
themselves into the future than younger children, contributing to a more accurate 
anticipation of future physiological states.  Lastly, shifting attention between tasks is an 
executive function that also naturally develops in young children, but does not appear to 
be as relevant to future thinking and episodic memory as are inhibition and working 
memory.  
          Although development of this adult tripartite structure seems to be in place early in 
the preschool years, executive function seems to be mediated by a unitary cognitive 
maturation factor that continues to differentiate into its separate components at least until 
8 years of age (Garon, Bryson & Smith, 2008; Weibe et al., 2011).  Thus, though the 
studies in the preschool literature sometimes assess these abilities separately, these 
measurements may be assessing one cognitive faculty mediated by the frontal lobe. 
Current Study  
          To examine the link between memory and future thinking, I took advantage of the 
co-development of these abilities in preschool children.  To measure episodic memory, a 
narrative task and a non-narrative task were administered.  The narrative paradigm was 
originally adapted from methods commonly used to assess episodic memory in adult 
amnesics (e.g., Race et al., 2011) and required children to generate a narrative of a 
memory in their past.  In order to control for the accuracy and nature of the memory 
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recalled, each child experienced a special classroom event in which an experimenter 
performed a novel demonstration of static electricity.  The non-narrative memory task 
included a list of short-answer questions to assess the accuracy of children’s memory of 
the static electricity demonstration.  
           To examine episodic future thinking, a narrative task similar to the narrative 
memory task was administered, in addition to a non-narrative task.  In the narrative future 
task, children were asked to imagine that a friend would come and play at their house for 
the first time one day in the future.  The richness of children’s memory of the past and 
imagination for the future was measured as the total number of details in their narratives, 
which were then subdivided into relevant episodic details and irrelevant external details.  
The non-narrative future thinking measure was the picture book trip-planning task 
(Atance & Meltzoff, 2005), which included photographs of scenes not typically familiar 
to preschoolers and required the child to select an item out of three choices that he/she 
would need to bring with them to the scene.  
           As a control task of narrative fluency, children were administered a narrative 
picture task that asked children to construct a narrative regarding a detailed picture.  The 
picture was visually rich in order to eliminate the need to mentally generate descriptive 
elements, but still made the cognitive demands related to the narrative aspect of the task.  
This narrative picture task provided a baseline measure of children’s verbal output and 
had similar narrative construction demands as the narrative memory and future thinking 
tasks.  Working memory, inhibition, and receptive vocabulary were also assessed since 
the memory and future thinking tasks likely recruited language and executive function to 
some extent. 
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          The study had three aims: 
            Aim 1: To examine age effects for episodic memory and future thinking.  The 
first aim was to demonstrate that children’s abilities to recall a past episode and foresee a 
future event improve significantly across the preschool years.  Based on the literature 
(Atance & Jackson, 2009), significant and parallel improvements in memory and in 
future thinking were predicted across the 3rd and 5th year of age.  Significant age effects 
were also predicted for narrative fluency, executive function, and language during this 
developmental period, consistent with previous literature (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Dun 
& Dun, 1997; Liles, 1993; Milner, 1971). 
Aim 2: To examine the relation between episodic memory and future 
thinking.  The second aim was to investigate whether children’s ability to recall an 
autobiographical event was directly correlated with their ability to anticipate a future 
scenario.  If episodic memory and future thinking are positively correlated at their 
emergence, as is observed in healthy and amnesic adults (Race et al., 2011), the two 
abilities may rely on the same neurocognitive basis. 
Aim 3: To investigate whether the relation between memory and future 
thinking is mediated by other factors.  The third aim was to examine to what extent 
episodic memory, future thinking, and the relationship between them are supported by 
working memory, inhibition, verbal ability, and narrative fluency. A significant 
contribution of these factors may suggest that the relationship between episodic memory 
and future thinking may be heavily reliant on, and thus an artifact of, natural 
improvements in cognitive capacities.   
 





Thirty-six preschoolers from a laboratory preschool and a day care facility 
participated in the study.  Seventeen younger preschoolers (Mage = 3.6 years, range: 39 – 
48 months, six females, 11 males) and 21 older preschoolers (Mage = 4.9 years, range: 54 
– 62 months; 11 females, 10 males) were recruited.  Data from four additional children 
were not included in the analysis due to inadequate completion of test sessions.  Written 
consent was obtained from each child’s parent or legal guardian prior to the beginning of 
the study. Children were predominantly Caucasian, of middle-to-upper-class backgrounds, 
and spoke English as their first language.   
Standardized Measures  
Non-narrative future thinking was assessed using the picture book trip-planning 
task (Atance & Meltzoff, 2005).  For this task, children were presented with a photobook 
containing 10 colored photographs (8.5 in. x 11 in.), the first four of which are “warm-
up” scenes of a birthday party, grocery store, swimming pool, and cookies.  The 
remaining six “test” photographs were pictures of the scenes that children were unlikely 
to have encountered in real life (e.g., a long dirt road, a waterfall, a steep mountain, a 
snowy forest, a sunny desert, a rocky stream) in order to minimize reliance on “script-
based” knowledge.  In each scene, the child reported what was in the photograph, was 
told to imagine going to the scene, and then was asked to point to one of the three item 
choices they needed to bring with them to the scene.  The three item choices paired with 
each scene colored were photographs (5 in. x 7 in.) that depicted various everyday objects 
(e.g., plate, shopping cart, shampoo).  Only one of the choices was a target picture needed 
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to satisfy a future physiological need for each scene (e.g., coat for the snowy forest 
condition).  The other two choices were distractor pictures, one of which was 
semantically related to the scene but irrelevant to a future need (e.g., ice cubes for snowy 
forest condition).  (See Appendix A for full list of choices for each scene.)  The 
placement of the choices on the table (i.e., left, right, or middle of child) was 
counterbalanced across scenarios so that the correct answer never appeared in each 
placement more than twice.  The non-narrative future thinking score was computed as the 
proportion of scenes that the child chose the item that accurately predicted a future need.  
Visuospatial working memory was tested using the Corsi block tapping test 
(Milner, 1977), a measure from the Working Memory Test Battery for Children (WMTB-
C).  In this working memory task, the child was presented with a random array of nine 
blocks and instructed to replicate the exact pattern of blocks tapped by the experimenter.  
After an initial practice trial, the experimenter tapped a pattern of X blocks and asked the 
child to repeat the pattern, and the subsequent five patterns involving the same number of 
blocks within the test trial.  When the child correctly performed at least four of total six 
patterns within the test trial, the experimenter administered the next test trial, which 
involved an additional block in the patterns.  The working memory span was recorded as 
the test trial that included the highest number of blocks that child was able to correctly 
reproduce in at least four of the six patterns.    
Inhibition assessed with the Grass/Snow inhibition task (Carlson & Moses, 2001).  
The child was shown a solid green card on the left and a solid white card on the right.  
Children were asked to name the color of grass and snow and to point to its card.  The 
task was then introduced as a game of opposites where the child would point to the green 
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card whenever the experimenter said “snow” and to the white card whenever the 
experimenter said “grass.”  The experimenter demonstrated first and then allowed the 
child to have two practice trials before 16 trials were administered in a pseudorandom 
order (GGSGSSGGSSSGGSSG).  The proportion correct was recorded.  
Verbal ability was assessed using the Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test-III Form 
B (PPVT-IIIB; Dunn & Dunn, 1997).  In this task, an easel was placed in front of the 
child.  Each page had a set of four pictures and the child was asked to point to the correct 
picture as the experimenter read a list of words.  Children’s raw scores were recorded.   
Procedure 
Four sessions of 10 to 15 minutes were conducted for each child.  No child 
completed two sessions on the same day or completed more than three sessions in the 
same week. Each test was conducted in a quiet, separate area with the child seated across 
from the experimenter. All sessions were audiorecorded and/or videotaped and each child 
received a sticker for his/her participation at the end of each session.  
             Session 1: Narrative memory task acquisition phase.  The purpose of the first 
session was to expose children to a prescribed event so that their memory of the event 
could be assessed at the next session.  Children experienced a novel static electricity 
demonstration with an experimenter they had never seen before.  Four children from the 
same class were seated on individual mats in the testing room.  The children’s teacher 
introduced the experimenter, “Aimee”, as a guest who would present a special science 
demonstration.  The teacher pointed out that Aimee was wearing a white lab coat.  Aimee 
greeted the children and showed them her red hatbox decorated with yellow stars.  (See 
Appendix A for full script.)  
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The experimenter opened her hatbox and took out a sock, balloon, and bowl of 
cereal and passed them around so that each child was able to hold each item. The 
experimenter first demonstrated that nothing happened when the balloon was placed on 
the bowl of cereal.  She then demonstrated that the cereal would stick to the balloon after 
the balloon was rubbed with the sock for 10 seconds.  After the experimenter performed 
this demonstration a second time, she explained that the cereal stuck to the balloon 
because of static electricity.  Each child was then allowed to hold the balloon and stick it 
on the cereal and then hold the bowl of cereal for the neighboring child to press the 
balloon onto it.  
             Session 2.  The main purpose of the second session was to administer narrative 
and non-narrative measures that tested children’s episodic memory of the static electricity 
demonstration.  The second session was administered to each child on the day after the 
first session.  To avoid indirect memory retrieval cues from the environment, the test 
phase of the memory task was administered by a different experimenter.  This session 
also included the Grass/Snow inhibition task and the narrative picture task as a measure 
of executive function and narrative fluency, respectively. 
Narrative memory task test phase.  Episodic memory was assessed in a narrative 
task.  Children were asked to recall the previous day’s static electricity demonstration in 
response to an open-ended question followed by a set of direct questions.  In the initial 
open-ended section, children were first verbally reminded that something special 
happened at school the previous day and were briefly shown a color picture of the red 
hatbox with stars (e.g., “I want you to tell me about yesterday. I heard that a girl named 
Aimee came in before and did a special science demonstration with this box”).  The 
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experimenter indicated that she was not present at the science demonstration but wanted 
to know what happened in the event (e.g., “I wasn’t there, but I really want to know what 
happened”).  Children were then asked an open-ended question about what happened at 
the special science demonstration: “I want to know who was with you in the science 
demonstration, where you were, what you saw and what you played with.  I’m going to 
write down everything you say.  So first what happened?”.  They were given a maximum 
of two minutes to respond, unless their responses naturally ended earlier.  Questions 
regarding the event were adapted from a study on preschoolers by Leichtman et al. 
(2000) and a study on adult amnesics by Race et al. (2011) so that questions were 
appropriate for 3-, 4- and 5-year olds.  The experimenter gave general prompts to 
encourage children’s responses in the open-ended section (e.g., “Then what happened in 
the science demonstration?”, “Tell me more about the science demonstration”,  “What 
else happened?”).  The experimenter was under strict instructions not to introduce any 
new idea, concept, entity, or detail not previously brought up by the child.  After 15 
seconds of sustained silence or a clear demonstration from the child that he or she was 
finished, the child was given a series of specific prompts and a maximum of 30 seconds 
for each response (e.g., “Who was with you in the science demonstration and what are 
their names?”, “What things did the person bring to the science demonstration?”, “What 
did you do in the science demonstration?”).  (See Appendix B for full list of prompts.) 
Non-narrative memory task.  Episodic memory was also assessed in a non-
narrative format.  Accuracy of the children’s memories of the static electricity 
demonstration was tested with a list of nine questions that required answers of one to a 
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few words (see Appendix B).  Non-narrative memory scores were computed as the 
proportion of questions that the child answered accurately. 
Grass/Snow inhibition task.  After the non-narrative memory task, the 
experimenter administered the Grass/Snow inhibition task, which was then followed by 
the narrative picture task.  
Narrative picture task. The narrative picture task provided a baseline measure of 
children’s narrative fluency, or ability to construct a story.  A picture used in by Race et 
al. (2011) was also used in the current task (Fig. 1A).  Children were asked to tell a story 
about what was happening in the picture.  A maximum of one minute was given for 
children’s responses to end naturally before the aided response phase began.  In this 
phase, the experimenter gave the following three prompts with a maximum of 30 seconds 
allowed in response to each: “What is happening in the picture?” “What are the people 
doing?” and “Anything else?”  
             Session 3.  The third session had three purposes: a) to assess children’s narrative 
future thinking ability, b) to measure visuospatial working memory, and c) to assess 
episodic memory with a simpler picture-based task.  The picture-based task will be 
correlated with the non-narrative and narrative memory tasks in order to see whether they 
all assessed similar constructs of memory.  The third session was administered any day 
within four weeks (M = 7 days, SD = 2.7) of the first session.  
              Narrative future thinking task.  Episodic future thinking ability was measured 
in a task similar to the narrative memory task.  The future thinking task included an open-
ended question followed a set of direct questions.  In the initial open-ended section, the 
child first named a friend who he/she liked to play with, but who had not come to their 
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house before.  The child was then asked to imagine what would happen if this friend 
came to their house on a day that had not happened yet.  A maximum of two minutes was 
given for children’s responses and the experiment gave general prompts to encourage 
children’s responses in the open-ended section (e.g., “Try your best, it can be anything.”, 
“Then what would happen when you play?”, “What else would happen?”).  The 
experimenter was under strict instructions not to introduce any new idea, word or theme 
not previously brought up by the child.  After 15 seconds of sustained silence or a clear 
demonstration from the child that he or she was finished, the child was then given 
specific prompts by the experimenter and a maximum of 30 seconds to respond (e.g., 
“What would [X] want to do at your house?”, “What would you want to play with [X] at 
your house?”, “What would [X] do or say at your house?”)  
Picture episodic memory task.  Episodic memory was assessed in a simple 
picture task.  The picture episodic memory task included an initial acquisition phase and 
a delayed test phase separated by the working memory measure described below.  Only 
25 children completed the picture episodic memory task due to timing and space 
constraints.   
In the acquisition phase, the experimenter laid down 12 pictures of common 
objects in front of the child at once.  Children were asked to name each picture as it was 
set down and the experimenter repeated or, if necessary, corrected the picture name for 
the child.  The three groups of pictures—animals, fruits and house items—each included 
four different black and white drawings.  Children were told to look carefully at each 
picture because the experimenter would take them away and ask them later what was in 
them.  The child then repeated the name of each picture once more with the experimenter.   
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In the test phase, the child was asked to freely recall the picture items and were 
given general prompts such as “What else?” and “Anything else?”.  After the child freely 
recalled as many pictures as possible, he/she was shown 24 pictures, half of which were 
studied pictures and half of which were semantically related distractor pictures.  The 
child was instructed to say “yes” or “no” to indicate whether he/she had seen the picture 
in the acquisition phase.  Pictures were presented in a pseudorandom order so that target 
pictures came up no more than twice in a row.  
Working memory task. Working memory was assessed using the Corsi block 
tapping test, which intervened between the acquisition and test phase of the picture 
episodic memory task.  
            Session 4. The purpose of the fourth session was a) to assess verbal ability and b) 
to assess future thinking using a non-narrative measure.  This session was administered to 
all participants within five weeks of the first session (M = 16 days).  
Verbal ability. Verbal ability was assessed using the Peabody Picture Vocabulary 
Test (PPVT).  
Non-narrative future thinking task.  Non-narrative future thinking was assessed 
with the picture book trip-planning task (Atance & Meltzoff, 2005).  
Coding 
 Performance on the narrative episodic memory and narrative future thinking tasks 
was scored with an adapted version of the Levine, Svoboda, Hay, Winocur, and 
Moscovitch (2002) autobiographical interview scoring procedure.  Each narrative was 
broken into details, which were then broadly categorized as episodic details or external 
details. Episodic details, which included occurrences and/or people internal to the 
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respective episode were further categorized as event, place, time, perceptual, and 
thought/emotion details.  External details included external event details (details from 
events other than the main event recalled or imagined), semantic details (general 
knowledge and facts, ongoing events, and extended states of being), repetition 
(unsolicited repetition of details) and other details (metacognitive statements and any 
editorializing).  
Reliability  
 Interrater reliability was calculated for one third of independently coded 
narratives.  The second rater was blind to the hypotheses and subject age, but the primary 
rater was not.  Intraclass correlation analysis revealed high agreement between scorers for 
most of the memory details (Cronbach’s α = 0.97 for total details; α = 0.59 for total 
external details, α = 0.99 for total episodic details) as well as for all future details 
(Cronbach’s α = 0.90 for total details; α = 0.81 for total external details, α = 0.92 for 
total episodic details).  Low reliability was accepted for the number of total external 
memory details as we found that mistakes in coding were due to one rater’s more 
expansive inclusion of metacomments and repetitions (e.g., “I’m not sure”).  Interrater 
reliability on the narrative picture task also ranged from moderately low (Cronbach’s α = 
0.67 for total details; α = 0.70 for total episodic details) to sufficient (α = 0.88 for total 
external details).  The somewhat low reliabilities for the narrative picture task qualified 
my interpretation of the results.  Scores given by the primary, more experienced rater 
were used in the final data analysis. 
 
 




 The present study was conducted with three aims: a) to examine age effects for 
episodic memory and future thinking, b) to examine the relationship between episodic 
memory and future thinking and c) to investigate whether the relation between memory 
and future thinking is mediated by working memory, inhibition, verbal ability, and 
narrative fluency.  In line with these three aims, results are presented as 1) developmental 
analyses of all tasks, 2) relation between episodic memory and future thinking, and 3) 
contribution of other factors to the relation between memory and future thinking.  
Developmental Analyses  	  
Cognitive factors.  Working memory, inhibition, verbal ability, and narrative 
fluency were hypothesized to improve significantly between younger and older children 
in the preschool years.  This hypothesis was supported (see Table 1).  Independent 
sample t-tests indicated that older preschoolers outperformed younger preschoolers on the 
Corsi block tapping test of working memory, Grass/Snow inhibition task, and PPVT of 
receptive vocabulary.  In the narrative picture task (which measured narrative fluency), as 
well as in other narrative tasks, all details were classified into two broad categories: 
episodic details or external details.  An independent samples t-test was performed on the 
mean number of total episodic details generated in the narrative picture task, with older 
children also outperforming younger children.  This result was qualified, however, by the 
low reliability scores in the narrative picture measure.  	  
Episodic memory and future thinking.  Episodic memory and future thinking 
were hypothesized to improve between the ages of three and five.  Four total tests were 
administered: the narrative memory task, the narrative future thinking task, the non-
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narrative memory task and the non-narrative memory task (picture book trip-planning 
task).  The mean number of total episodic details was compared between the narrative 
tasks (Table 1).  The hypothesis was supported for three of the four tasks.  Older children 
outperformed younger children on the non-narrative future thinking task, the non-
narrative memory task, and the narrative memory task.  In the narrative future task, 
however, older children did not differ from younger preschoolers in the number of 
episodic details generated.  
In a separate analysis, the total number of episodic details reported by each child 
in the narrative memory and future thinking tasks was categorized into five episodic 
subcategories.  These subcategories corresponded to event, place, time, perceptual 
details, and thought/emotion details.  (See Figure 1 for means in each category for the 
narrative memory and the narrative future thinking tasks.)  In addition, external details 
that did not pertain to the prompted memory or future episode were divided into 
subcategories of external events, semantic details, repetitions, and other details.  Due to 
the low mean numbers of overall external details in both the narrative memory task and 
the narrative future thinking task, and the non-significant differences between younger 
and older groups (p values > .10), external details are not further discussed.           
The distribution of episodic details for the narrative memory and future tasks were 
compared in a 2 (age: older, younger) x 2 (temporal direction: past (memory), future) x 5 
(detail category: event, place, time, perceptual, thought/emotion) mixed factorial analysis 
of variance (ANOVA).  This exploratory analysis was performed without any prior 
hypotheses except for any a main effect of age.  Specifically, older children were 
expected to produce more episodic details in both conditions than younger children.  The 
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ANOVA revealed no main effect of age, F(1, 36) = 2.67, p > .10, and no main effect of 
temporal direction, F(1, 36) = 0.60 p > .40, indicating that the overall number of episodic 
details did not differ between younger and older preschoolers (contrary to expectation) or 
between the memory and future thinking tasks.  However, the main effect of detail 
subcategory was significant, F(1, 36) = 25.26, p < .001.  Follow-up pairwise analyses 
indicated that the number of event details and perceptual details did not differ (p > .50) 
and was greater than the number of place details, time details and perceptual details (t 
values > 7.40, p values < .001), which did not differ (p values < .05).   
The presence of a detail category x temporal direction interaction indicated that 
the pattern of details across subcategories differed between the memory and future tasks, 
F(1, 36) = 7.53, p < .010, with the narrative future thinking task eliciting more time 
details (posthoc t(64) = 3.92 , p < .001) and marginally significantly more place details 
(posthoc t(74) = 1.69 , p = .095) than the narrative memory task.  There was no age x 
detail category interaction.  However, an age x temporal direction interaction was 
observed, F(1, 36) = 7.31, p < .05, indicating that older children generated significantly 
more details in the memory task, t(37) = 2.41, p < .05,  but not in the future thinking task 
t(23) = 0.13, p > .50.  Lastly, no 3-way interaction emerged, F(1, 36) = 0.028, p > .50.  
Relation Between Episodic Memory and Future Thinking  
Correlation between episodic memory and future thinking.  A positive 
correlation between episodic memory and future thinking was predicted.  Bivariate 
Pearson’s correlations indicated that generation of episodic memory details was 
positively correlated with generation of episodic future thinking details in the narrative 
tasks.  A positive correlation was also observed between performance on the non-
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narrative memory and future thinking tasks (r values > 0.30, p values < .05).  Scatterplots 
of both correlations are presented in Figure 2 with regression lines and the respective 
Pearson correlation coefficient.  
Contributions of other cognitive factors to memory and future thinking 
tasks.  Pearson correlation coefficients were obtained between the four memory and 
future thinking tasks and the four ancillary cognitive tasks, and are presented in Table 2.  
As expected, narrative fluency and verbal ability were positively correlated with nearly 
all measures of memory and future thinking.  The exception was between verbal ability 
and narrative future thinking.  None of the narrative memory and future thinking 
measures were correlated with inhibition (See Table 2), though the non-narrative future 
thinking measure was correlated with working memory span r = 0.47, p < .010.  
Partial correlations.  Partial correlations were conducted to determine whether 
the correlation between episodic memory and future thinking was the result of 
contributions of narrative fluency, and other cognitive factors to memory and future 
thinking.  Table 3 shows the correlations between narrative memory and future thinking, 
and between non-narrative memory and future thinking, after these factors were partialled 
out.  Though both Pearson correlation coefficients decreased, episodic detail generation 
in the narrative memory task and narrative future task remained positively correlated after 
performing partial correlations, r = 0.38, p < .05, in line with my hypothesis.  However, 
the correlation between the non-narrative memory and non-narrative future thinking 
ability (p > .10) did not remain significant after controlling for outside variables.  
 
 




             The present study used narrative and non-narrative measures to examine episodic 
memory and future thinking in preschoolers.  The narrative measures were adapted from 
a paradigm commonly used in amnesia studies (Race et al., 2011) whereas the non-
narrative measures were similar to those more commonly used in developmental studies 
(Atance & Meltzoff, 2005; Naito & Suzuki, 2011).  Three of the four memory and future 
thinking tasks demonstrated age effects over the course of the preschool age range, 
indicating substantial development of non-narrative memory, non-narrative future 
thinking and narrative memory between	  the	  age	  of	  3	  and	  5	  years.  However, children 
did not improve with age on the narrative future thinking task, possibly due to inherent 
differences between narrative future thinking and narrative memory.	  
          Nevertheless, the positive correlations revealed that narrative memory and 
narrative future thinking abilities were associated, as were non-narrative memory and 
non-narrative future thinking.  These correlations suggest that memory and future 
thinking are related, and that this relationship may stem from a shared dependence on a 
common neurocognitive core.  However, outside factors could potentially contribute to 
the relationship between memory and future thinking especially during the extremely rich 
developmental period of the preschool years.  The literature indicates marked 
improvements across multiple domains (Carlson & Moses, 2001; Dun & Dun, 1997; 
Liles, 1993; Milner, 1971) that could be involved in memory and future thinking tasks.  
In line with the literature, older preschoolers in the present study outperformed younger 
preschoolers on narrative fluency, working memory, inhibition, and verbal ability tasks.  
To examine whether these other developing cognitive factors contribute to the 
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relationship between memory and future thinking, partial correlations were conducted to 
see whether the correlation between memory and future thinking would persist even after 
controlling for narrative fluency, working memory, inhibition and receptive vocabulary.  
The relationship between narrative memory and future thinking remained significant even 
after these factors were partialled out.  By contrast, the relationship between non-
narrative memory and future thinking disappeared after these factors were controlled for.   
          These results demonstrate that the relation between narrative memory and narrative 
future thinking is not due to shared dependence on narrative fluency, working memory, 
inhibition or receptive vocabulary.  However, the relation between the non-narrative 
memory and non-narrative future thinking can be explained by a common reliance on at 
least one of these other factors.  These findings are unexpected since non-narrative tasks 
were assumed to have less narrative, working memory and language demands than the 
narrative tasks.  Specifically, the non-narrative tasks required children to answer short, 
direct questions about a novel science demonstration in the memory task and to select a 
picture of the item they would bring with them to a trip in the future task.  Out of the four 
ancillary cognitive factors, verbal ability accounts for the greatest amount of the variance 
in the relation between the non-narrative tasks.  However, because the non-narrative tasks 
did not strongly depend on verbal output, verbal ability is not likely to be a causal factor, 
but rather an age-related predictor.      
          Interestingly, to reiterate an above point, the relationship between narrative 
memory and future thinking was not due to their common reliance on narrative fluency.  
Both abilities are highly related to performance on the narrative picture task, which can 
be interpreted as a baseline measure of narrative fluency.  The striking finding, however, 
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is that though the positive relation between narrative memory	  and	  future	  thinking	  
weakened after controlling for the contributions of narrative fluency, it continued to be 
significantly correlated.  Similar results were observed in the original study of amnesia 
conducted by Race et al. (2011) study, in which highly correlated impairments in 
narrative memory and future thinking were not accounted for by performance on a 
narrative picture task.  Taken together, these findings negate the hypothesis that the 
positive correlation between narrative memory and future thinking is an artifact of their 
common dependence on narrative fluency/construction.  Furthermore, this relationship 
persists even after more conservative partial correlations controlled for the contribution 
of verbal ability, working memory, and inhibition, in addition to narrative fluency.  
          Zero-order correlations can be examined for a finer-grained understanding of the 
relations among episodic memory, future thinking, and other abilities such as narrative 
fluency, working memory, inhibition and receptive vocabulary.  With one exception, 
memory and future thinking were positively correlated with narrative fluency and verbal 
ability.  More specifically, children who generated more episodic details when describing 
a picture and possessed greater receptive vocabularies also tended to score better on the 
memory and future thinking tasks.  Although not crucially contributing to the relationship 
between memory and future thinking, narrative fluency and verbal ability appear to be 
associated with performance on these tasks.   
          Surprisingly, working memory and inhibition were not correlated with any task, 
except non-narrative future thinking ability.  This finding is unexpected given what is 
known about working memory and inhibition, and the likelihood that these abilities are 
recruited in order to perform well on episodic memory and future thinking tasks.  
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Working memory and inhibition are two components of executive function, a 
multifaceted general system that manages and controls other cognitive processes, and 
heavily engages the frontal lobes.  Better working memory and inhibition were 
hypothesized to be related to performance on narrative tasks in particular, especially 
since these abilities were expected to aid children in holding information in mind and 
inhibiting irrelevant information while constructing a story.  Instead, working memory 
correlated with non-narrative future thinking, perhaps by providing online capacities of 
the prefrontal cortex to hold information in temporary storage.  A possible explanation 
for the lack of correlations between executive function tasks and other memory and 
future thinking tasks is that executive function has not sufficiently developed by the 
preschool years to be reliably recruited for these tasks.  Executive domains generally 
improve across preschool and childhood at different rates and are mature by 12 years of 
age (Anderson, 2010).  In older age ranges, successful episodic memory and future 
thinking might recruit the goal-directed, attention and cognitive resources offered by 
executive function.  Thus, correlations may be expected between executive function and 
memory/future thinking tasks in children older than preschoolers. 
Relationship between narrative memory and future thinking 
          Narrative memory and future thinking share fundamental commonalities that may 
explain their link in development.  At least two different possibilities have emerged in the 
literature as possible “core” cognitive mechanisms underlying narrative memory and 
future thinking: a) similar use of mental travel into another time, place or perspective 
(Schacter et al., 2007; Tulving, 2002) or b) similar reliance on scene construction 
(Hassabis & Maguire, 2007).  
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           Memory and future thinking invoke mental time travel beyond immediately 
present states, but in different directions.  The ability to mentally project oneself to re-live 
past experiences and pre-live future events is naturally acquired in development and 
becomes embedded in daily and adaptive functioning in later years (Atance & Jackson, 
2009; Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997).  Mental time travel depends on various capacities 
such as self-awareness, mental representation, and differentiation between imagined and 
current states (Suddendorf & Corballis, 1997; Wheeler et al., 1997).  Both narrative and 
non-narrative tasks in the present study required mental time travel and these 
supplementary capacities, though an important distinction should be made between the 
narrative and non-narrative tasks.  The narrative tasks specifically required children to 
recall/generate a novel science demonstration or a play date almost “from scratch.”  For 
this reason, performance on the narrative tasks, but not on the non-narrative tasks, was 
considered to reflect scene construction in addition to mental time travel.  Scene 
construction is a type of mental imagery that entails generation, maintenance and 
visualization of events in their setting (Hassabis & Maguire, 2007).  	  
          Non-narrative tasks, rather than measures of scene construction, are more exclusive 
measures of mental time travel ability (Atance & Meltzoff, 2005).  Non-narrative tasks 
did not require the effortful generation of a scene.  Instead, the experimenter aided 
children with direct, short-answer questions about the science demonstration in the non-
narrative memory task and visually presented the scenarios and a set of choices in the 
non-narrative future task.  These measures tested exclusively for the accuracy of mental 
time travel since children needed to correctly recall specific details and anticipate a likely 
need.  However, results of the present study show that the correlation between non-
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narrative memory and non-narrative future thinking disappeared after factors of narrative 
fluency, executive function and verbal ability were controlled for.  Thus, mental time 
travel is not the exclusive mediator of the significant correlation between memory and 
future thinking when measured by non-narrative tasks.  	  
         In contrast to the non-narrative tasks, the narrative memory and future thinking 
tasks remained positively correlated even after controlling for narrative fluency, working 
memory, inhibition, and verbal ability.  Due to the narrative tasks’ emphasis on detail 
generation, scene construction is suspected to be the major common process in both 
narrative memory and narrative future thinking.  In line with the scene construction 
hypothesis (Hassabis & Maguire, 2007), a core network underlying memory and future 
thinking may be activated by the simulation process and visuospatial aspects of scenes.  
Scene construction also appears, theoretically, to involve detail generation and detail 
combination/recombination inherent to the reconstructive nature of episodic memory and 
future thinking.  Thus, the persistent correlation between the narrative tasks, but not 
between the non-narrative tasks, supports the possibility that scene construction, in 
addition to mental time travel, is an important process involved in both abilities, rather 
than mental time travel exclusively.    
          According to the constructive episodic stimulation hypothesis (Schacter et al., 
2007), the future thinking system draws upon the inherently combinatory nature of 
memory to flexibly reassemble details from past events.  In this view, memory and future 
thinking are independent abilities that rely on scene construction and are thus positively 
correlated due to similar engagement this key mechanism.  An alternative interpretation 
of the link between memory and future thinking is that a child may be able to generate 
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more details and imagine a richer future event if he/she has a larger reservoir of personal 
experiences to assemble into new possibilities (Suddendorf, 2010a).  Put another way, 
episodic memory itself may play an essential part of future thinking by providing the 
actual raw details for the future thinking system to recombine in novel scenarios. 	  
            Findings from the original Race et al. (2011) study do not rule out either of the 
above views on the relationship between memory and future thinking.  Race et al. (2011) 
demonstrated that the medial temporal lobe is critically involved in narrative memory and 
future thinking.  One interpretation of this result is that the memory deficit that arises 
from brain damage to the hippocampus may cause impaired future thinking.  However, 
an alternative interpretation is still permissible.  Since the hippocampus is also involved 
in the binding of details and perhaps scene construction, hippocampal damage may cause 
a binding/scene construction deficit that is the true cause of both memory and future 
thinking deficits.  Further research is needed to fully understand how best to 
conceptualize the link between memory and future thinking.   
Differences between narrative memory and future thinking. 
Though linked, narrative memory and narrative future thinking abilities develop 
differently during the preschool years.  Whereas older preschoolers demonstrated better 
narrative memory than younger preschoolers, no age effect was observed for narrative 
future thinking.  Remarkably, narrative memory and future thinking were still correlated, 
even after accounting for the influences of narrative fluency, working memory, inhibition 
and receptive vocabulary.  This stable relation between narrative memory and future 
thinking, in spite of inconsistent age effects, indicate that the mechanism by which they 
are supported may be age-independent.  Furthermore, this age-independent factor—
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perhaps scene construction or another capacity—permits enough individual variability for 
narrative future thinking to still be positively correlated with narrative memory.  
In order to better understand the link between narrative memory and narrative 
future thinking, differences between the two are examined.  Perhaps the most obvious 
distinction is that past episodes are already represented and can be recalled, whereas 
future episodes have virtually infinite possibilities and need to be constructed.  Thus, the 
distribution of readily accessible details is asymmetrical, in favor of relatively prescribed 
and concrete memory episodes (Suddendorf, 2010a; Viard et al., 2011).  Narrative future 
thinking requires more cognitive effort than narrative memory because children are 
required to generate a completely unfamiliar scene from scratch.  Differences in future 
thinking ability between younger and older children became visible when the scenes were 
presented in front of them; an age effect for future thinking was demonstrated in the non-
narrative future thinking task, which visually aided children with photographs of the 
scenes they were supposed to imagine.  Presentation of the scenes allows children to 
circumvent the more effortful mental generation of scenes involved in narrative future 
thinking.  
Behavioral studies in children also support the differential development of 
episodic memory and future thinking.  The ability to project oneself to the future appears 
to develop later than the ability to project oneself to the past (Friedman, 1992; Friedman, 
2002).  Four-year-olds fail to differentiate distances ranging up to a year in the future 
(Friedman, 2002), but are able to retrieve accurate memories from nearly all of the 
following times: yesterday, last weekend, last summer, and several holidays in the past 
year (Friedman, 1992).  A self-awareness of time continues to develop well into primary 
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school, with eight-year-olds and nine-year-olds able to mentally represent times of the 
year in accurate order.  Delayed discrimination of future time in young preschoolers may 
reflect a nascent transition from current states to consideration of future possibilities.  
Furthermore, brain imaging data in adults demonstrate differential activation of certain 
brain regions for future thinking and episodic memory, particularly in the anteromedial 
frontal pole and MTL (Okuda et al., 2003; Suddendorf, 2010a).  These findings indicate 
that despite substantial overlap in the neural correlates for episodic memory and future 
thinking, differences still exist between the two abilities that can manifest on the 
cognitive level.   
Future thinking not only involves mental scene construction and mental time 
travel, but an additional requirement of recombining details in novel ways (Atance & 
Jackson, 2009; Hassabis et al., 2007).  In support of this observation, Suddendorf (2010b) 
revealed an association between preschoolers’ divergent thinking, which is also involved 
in creativity, and the number of answers children generated about what they would do 
tomorrow.  However, divergent thinking did not correlate with the number of answers 
children gave pertaining to what they did the day before, suggesting that spontaneous 
imagination is more specific to future thinking.  Moreover, in a pilot study with eight 
children, I found that preschoolers had marked difficulty imagining a play date with a 
friend in a new place they had never been to before, such as a tree house.  Despite the fact 
that preschoolers could readily identify what a tree house was and that they could play 
whatever they wanted in it, children were rarely able to come up with possibilities of 
what they could do.  Children continued to have difficulty in another trial that asked them 
to play with three different everyday toys (e.g., stick, sock, and paper) by themselves.   
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Children often cited reasons such as “I don’t know,” “I never went there,” or “I never 
played with them together before” and seemed unfamiliar even with the possibility that 
these events could happen.   
 In order to avoid floor effects, the narrative future thinking task in the present 
study was created so that the novel event would occur in a familiar place: the child’s 
home.  Children invoked episodic future thinking in this narrative future thinking task 
because the friend had never come to his/her house before and children had to imagine 
this new event.  However, children’s ritualized scripts of their home and personal 
knowledge of their friend likely aided them in thinking of possibilities such as where and 
with what activities and toys he/she could play with the friend.  This information should 
be accounted for in interpretations explaining the lack of an observed age effect on the 
narrative future thinking task but persistent correlation with narrative memory.  
One view is that the wide variability in children’s familiarity and episodic 
memories of their homes, friends and play dates obscured the narrative future task’s 
sensitivity to measure age differences in episodic future thinking.  At the same time, this 
source of age-independent variability could allow narrative memory and future thinking 
to be correlated on an individual basis.  For example, the richness of children’s past 
experiences playing in certain areas of their house, with certain toys or friends may 
support children’s responses for what to do on a future play date.  In another words, 
children with more specific and accessible details in their memories are likely, by 
extension, to have more raw materials to construct more detailed possibilities than 
children with fewer accessible details.  This interpretation assumes that the narrative 
future thinking task designed for the current study was not sensitive enough to 
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demonstrate age effects, particularly because of variable contributions from semantic 
knowledge and past memories.  Nonetheless, the persistent correlation between narrative 
memory and future thinking remains consistent with the possibility that episodic memory 
may actually contribute to future thinking ability.  
In conclusion, the developmental relationship between episodic memory and 
future thinking is highly complex.  Preschoolers improve on nearly all measures of 
episodic memory and future thinking, except for narrative future thinking.  Differential 
age effects for narrative memory and narrative future thinking highlighted some of the 
fundamental differences between memory and future thinking.  Nevertheless, memory 
and future thinking appear to at least partially share some neurocognitive resources.  This 
interpretation is supported by a correlation between narrative memory and narrative 
future thinking even after controlling for narrative fluency, working memory, inhibition 
and receptive vocabulary.  The persistence of the correlation between the narrative tasks 
but not between the non-narrative tasks after partial correlations suggests that scene 
construction and mental time travel, rather than exclusively mental time travel, may be 
crucially involved in both abilities during the preschool years.
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Table 1  
Comparisons of Older and Younger Preschoolers on all Tasks.  
Task Younger preschoolers 
(n = 17) 
Older preschoolers 
(n = 21) 
Age effects 
 
Executive function    
    Working memory (Corsi block span) 2.47 (0.12) 3.33 (0.16) t(36) = 4.11*** 
     Inhibition (max = 1.00) 0.51 (0.07) 0.74 (0.06) t(36) = 2.03* 
Verbal ability  






t(36) = 6.46*** 
    
Narrative Picture 






t(36) = 2.68* 
Episodic memory    
    Narrative (total # details)      19.82 (3.50) 31.95 (2.74) t(36) = 2.77** 
    Non-narrative (max = 1.00) 0.60 (0.06) 0.78 (0.04) t(36) = 2.84** 
  a  
Episodic future thinking    
     Narrative (total # details) 27.29 (4.56) 27.81 (1.81) t(21) = 0.11 
    Non-narrative (max = 1.00) 0.54 (0.05) 0.87 (0.03) t(22) = 5.17*** 
Note. Standard Errors of the Mean reported in parentheses.  
*p < 0.05. **p < 0.01. ***p < 0.001. 
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Table 2  
Correlations between Key Episodic Task Performance and Verbal Ability, Working Memory, Inhibition, and Narrative Picture. 
Task Verbal Ability Working Memory Inhibition Narrative Picture 
Narrative Memory          0.45**             0.23              0.029               0.56*** 
Narrative Future          0.14           -0.093                -0.13               0.41* 
Non-narrative Memory          0.36*            0.27              0.073               0.35* 
Non-narrative Future          0.60**            0.47**              0.18               0.40* 
Note.  
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Table 3  
Partial Correlations between Narrative and Non- narrative Memory and Future Thinking 
Tasks after Controlling for Age, Narrative Fluency, Executive Function (Working 
Memory & Inhibition) and Verbal Ability. 
 
Task Narrative Future Non-narrative Future 
Narrative Memory 0.38*  
Non-narrative Memory  0.075 
*p < .05 
 
 





Figure 1. Mean number of episodic details generated by younger and older preschoolers 
across each episodic detail category for the narrative memory and narrative future 
thinking tasks.  Error bars indicate Standard Error of the Mean.  
 
 





Figure 2. Bivariate Pearson’s correlations between narrative memory and future thinking 
scores and between non-narrative memory and future thinking scores. (a) The number of 
narrative-generated memory details was positively correlated with the number of 
narrative-generated future details. (b) Non-narrative memory scores were positively 
correlated with non-narrative future scores.  *p < .05.  **p < .01.       








Narrative Future Thinking Task  
Free Response Instructions  
“My game is about writing down what children say and I’m going to write down what 
you tell me on my piece of paper.  Who is one friend from your class that you like to play 
with?  Has [X] ever gone to your house before?  (If not: “Who is another friend from you 
class that has not gone to your house?  Has [Y] ever gone to your house before?”)  What 
if [X] came to your house sometime on a day that hasn’t happened yet.  Let’s think about 
what could happen and how you would want to play with [X].  I want to know what kinds 
of things you play with, what you would do, and where you would play in your house.  
So first what would happen?”   
Prompts allowed: “Try your best.”, “This can be kind of hard.”, “Let’s think about it for 
a while.”, “Then what would happen.”, “Tell me more about what would happen.”, 
“What is one more thing that could happen?”, “What else could you do?”, “What is one 
last thing that could happen?”, Anything else?” 
Aided Response Instructions  
1. Can you tell me what [X] would want to do at your house?  
2. What would you want to play with [X] at your house? 
3. What would [X] do or say at your house? 
4. When would you play with [X] at your house?  
5. Where would you play with [X] at your house?  What would the room look like? 
6. How would [X] feel if he/she could play with you at your house?  
7. How would you feel if [X] could come and play at your house? 
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Note: If a child responds with “I don’t know”, the experimenter can say any of the 
following: “Try your best,” “Then what could happen,” and “Tell me more.”  If the child 
already answered a question in the initial free-response minute, the experimenter will 
add, “I forgot to write all of it down.  Tell me again.”  
 
Non-narrative Future Thinking Task 
Picture book trip-planning task scenarios and choices (Atance & Meltzoff, 2005) 
Scenario           Correct Item   Distracter 1             Distracter 2   
Warm-up 
  Birthday party                Balloons     Book   Toothpaste 
  Grocery store       Shopping cart      Towel  Bear   
  Swimming pool       Water wings       Gloves  Mirror 
  Cookies        Plate          Shampoo  Blanket 
  
Test 
  Road                    Water     Present  Plant 
  Waterfall            Raincoat                  Money  Rocks   
  Mountain             Lunch                   Bowl   Sticks 
  Snow        Winter Coat      Swimming suit Ice cube     
  Desert       Sunglasses     Soap   Seashell 
  Stream        Band-aids      Pillow  Fish 
Note. Warm-up and test scenarios are listed with their three item choices. In the test 
phase, Distracter 2 items were semantically associated with their respective test 
scenarios. 
Warm-up Task 
“We’re going to play a game with pictures.  It has two parts.”  Experimenter points to 
first picture. “What do you see in this picture?  Okay, let’s pretend that we’re going to 
this [scenario].  It’s time to get ready to go.  Which one of these do you need to bring 
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with you?”  Three choice items are placed in front of the child in a counterbalanced 
order.  Questions repeated for scenarios 2-4.   
Experimental Task 
The following instructions are read for their respective scene with the placement of three 
choice items in front of the child in a counterbalanced order. 
1. “What do you see in this picture?  Okay, let’s pretend that we’re going to this walk 
across the long road.  It’s time to get ready to go. Which one of these do you need to 
bring with you?  
2. “What do you see in this picture?  Okay, let’s pretend that we’re going to this walk 
next to the waterfall.  It’s time to get ready to go. Which one of these do you need to 
bring with you? 
3. “What do you see in this picture?  Okay, let’s pretend that we’re going to this walk 
across the mountain.  It’s time to get ready to go. Which one of these do you need to 
bring with you?  
4. “What do you see in this picture?  Okay, let’s pretend that we’re going to this walk 
across the snow.  It’s time to get ready to go. Which one of these do you need to bring 
with you?  
5. “What do you see in this picture?  Okay, let’s pretend that we’re going to this walk 
under the sun.  It’s time to get ready to go. Which one of these do you need to bring with 
you?  
6. “What do you see in this picture?  Okay, let’s pretend that we’re going to this walk 
across the rocks.  It’s time to get ready to go. Which one of these do you need to bring 
with you?  




Narrative Memory Task Acquisition Phase 
Full Script 
Static Electricity Objects: sock-balloon-cereal 
Teacher: “This is a special day because Aimee is here to do a special science 
demonstration.  She is standing right there and wearing a white lab coat.  Hello Aimee!’ 
A: “Hello, I’m Aimee and I have my red box with stars with me.”  (Sits on floor and lifts 
up lid of box). 
A: “First I want to know a little bit more about you.  What is your name?  I’m Aimee.”  
(repeat to each child) 
A: “I’m going to take out three special objects from my box.”  (Take out one at a time). 
“The first one is a red sock!  I’m going to pass around the sock so that everybody gets a 
turn holding it!  The second one is the white balloon!  The third one is a bowl of cereal!” 
A: “Now I’m going to put the balloon on the cereal. Nothing happens!  But watch what 
happens when I do this!  I’m going to rub the balloon with the sock and count to 10.  1-2-
3-4-5-6-7-8-9-10!  Now I’m going to put the balloon on the cereal.  Look, the cereal is 
sticking to the balloon!  Lets do it again and this time you can count with me. 1-2-3-4-5-
6-7-8-9-10!  
A: “This because of something called static electricity.  Static electricity is making the 
cereal stick to the balloon after I rub it with the sock.  Before there was no static 
electricity when I didn’t rub the balloon with the sock.  But this time the balloon sticks to 
the cereal after I rubbed it with a sock! Now I’m going to come around to each of you so 
that you can all have a turn to try.   
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A:  “Have you ever seen anyone else make static electricity with a sock, balloon and 
bowl of cereal before?  No?  It looks like this is new for everybody!”  
A: “I’m going to put my three special objects back into my box: the sock, the balloon, 
and bowl of cereal.  Now I’m all done!”   
A:  “Now since you were all good children, I’m going to give you all a sticker.” 
Teacher: “That is a really neat project.  Now Aimee is going to leave!  Let’s say 
goodbye!” 
A:  “Thanks for letting me show you my special science demonstration!”      
 
Narrative Memory Test Phase 
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Free Response Instructions 
 “My game is about writing down what children say and I’m going to write down what 
you tell me on my piece of paper.  I want you to tell me about yesterday.  I heard that a 
girl named Aimee came in before and did a special science demonstration with this box 
(shows above color picture briefly).  I wasn’t there, but I really want to know what 
happened.  I want to know who was with you in the science demonstration, where you 
were, what you saw and what you played with.  I’m going to write down everything that 
happened.  So first what happened?”   
Prompts allowed: “Try your best.”, “This is kind of hard.”, “Let’s think about it for a 
while.”, “Then what happened in the science demonstration.”, “Tell me more about the 
science demonstration.”, “What is one thing that happened?”, “What else happened?”, 
“What is one last thing that happened?”, “Anything else?”.  
Aided Response Instructions 
1. Who were with you in the science demonstration and what are their names?   
2. What things did the person bring to the science demonstration?  
3. What did you do in the science demonstration? 
4. What did the people do or say in the science demonstration?  
5. When did this science demonstration happen?  
6. Where did this science demonstration happen and what did the room look like?  
7. How did children feel during this science demonstration?  
8. How did you feel during the science demonstration? 
Note: If a child responds with “I don’t know” or “I don’t remember,” the experimenter 
can say any of the following: “Try your best,” “Then what happened in the science 
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demonstration,” and “Tell me more.”  If the child already answered a question in the 
initial free-response minute, the experimenter will add, “I forgot to write all of it down.  
Tell me again.”  
 
Non-narrative Memory Task 
1. How long do you have to rub the balloon with the sock for it to stick?  (What number 
did you count to) 
2. What color jacket was Aimee wearing?  
3. What color was the sock?                                        
4. What color was the balloon?   
5. What color was the bowl?        
6. What color was the cereal? 
7. What did you sit on?  
8. Why did the balloon stick to the cereal after you rubbed it with a sock?  



















Free Response Instructions 
“I’m going to show you a picture.  I want you to tell me a story about what’s happening 
in the picture.  I want to know about the people, where they are, and what they are doing 
and I’m going to write down everything that you say.  So first what’s happening?” 
Prompts allowed: “Do you see anything?”, “What else?”, “Is there one thing that is 
happening?”, “Is there one last thing?”, “Anything else?”.  
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Aided Response Instructions 
1. What is happening in the picture? 
2. What are the people doing?  
3. Anything else? 
Note: If a child responds with “I don’t know”, the experimenter can say any of the 
following: “Try your best,” “Anything else?” and “What else?”  If the child already 
answered a question in the initial free-response minute, the experimenter will add, “I 
forgot to write all of it down.  Tell me again.”  
 
 
